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unF statement is generally accepted that Thomas v. Cook" was
Dverruled by Green v. Cresswell,2 and that the latter case was
4
3
in turn repudiated by Reader v. Kingham and Wildes v. Dudlow.
Because American courts have given expression to the same opinion, this view'is undoubtedly accepted by most jurisdictions, after
much vacillation and without reference to any clear ground of
principle.5 But it is submitted that the cases mentioned are distinguishable, and Green v. Cresswell did not necessarily overrule
T

*Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School, Washington, D. C.
'(1828) 8 Barn.,& Cres. 728.
'(1839) 10 Ad. & Ell. 453.
2(1862) 13 C. B. N. S. 344.
'(1874) L. R. 19 Eq. 198.
'Of the problems arising out of the cases mentioned, the supreme court
of Pennsylvania observed in Nugent v. Wolfe,-(1886) 111 Pa. 471, 4 Atl.
15, that: "During the more than two centuries since its original enactment
(the statute of frauds) the construction of this section, and its application to various forms of contract, have been constantly the subject of contention; and on no question, perhaps, has there been greater diversity and
contrariety of judicial decision in this as well as in the parent country."
These expressions give an idea of the American view: Stearns, Suretyship, 3rd ed., sec. 32, says: "Such was the reasoning of Green v. Cresswell,
which overruled Thomas v. Cook, but which was, in turn, repudiated by
the later cases in England."
1 Williston, Contracts, 928, note 70: "But in later English cases,
Green v. Cresswell seems overruled."
These authorities reflect a similar view in England: In Wildes v.
Dudlow, (1874) L. R. 19 Eq. 198, it was said: "But I am happy to find
that, the matter having been most carefully and elaborately considered in
the case of Reader v. Kingham, when the full number of judges was present, the case of Green v. Cresswell was overruled, and the law as laid
down by Thomas v. Cook restored."
Guild & Co. v. Conrad, [1894] 2 Q. B. 885,893; "Unquestionably it
[Thomas v. Cobk] was not followed by the Court of Queen's Bench in
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Tho&m v. Cook, in spite of the fact that Lord Denman said of
the latter case that "the reasoning in this case does not appear to
us to be satisfactory in support of the doctrine there laid down.""
However, one attempting to criticize the cases which are generally
accepted to be orthodox must have the feeling of the sage of last
century, who, faced with a similar self-imposed task, declared that
his "observations are hazarded with great diffidence, as they ap' 7
parently militate against great authorities.
These two hypothetical cases, involving promises to indemnify
one who becomes guarantor to a third person, will illustrate concretely the main problems presented by the cases considered:
(a) A verbally states to B: "If you will sign C's note, as surety,
payable to X, and are compelled to pay it, I will reimburse you."
(b) A verbally states to B: "If you will sign a note with me,
payable to X, and are compelled to pay it, I will reimburse you."
In Thomas v. Cook, W. Cook and Morris were in a partnership, which was dissolved by agreement, Morris retiring. Morris
would, of course, be liable for the prior partnership debts' incurred
while he was a member of it. To protect him, it was agreed
between W. Cook and Morris, that W. Cook and two other persons
should execute to Morris a bond of indemnity to save Morris from
liability of these partnership debts. This bond of indemnity was
given in accord with this understanding. Neither agreement yet
mentioned was the subject of the suit in Thomas v. Cook. But, in
order to induce the plaintiff to sign this bond of indemnity to Morris, along with W. Cook and the defendant, the defendant verbally
promised the plaintiff, and in consideration therefor, that if the
plaintiff would sign the bond of indemnity to Morris "with the
defendant and W. Cook," the defendant would save the plaintiff
harmless from all damages and costs which the plaintiff might have
to pay by reason of becoming liable on the indemnity bond to Morris, as obligee. The bond of indemnity was signed by the plaintiff
and the defendant, as sureties for W. Cook, principal. The plaintiff was compelled to pay £400 to Morris on the bond of indemnity. Plaintiff then recovered £100 from the estate of W. Cook,
he being since deceased. This left a deficiency of £300, and the
Green v. Cresswell and Cripps v. Hartnoll; but, notwithstanding the
criticism of the learned judges in those cases, Thomas v. Cook was set
on its feet again by the decision of the Court of the Exchequer Chamber
in the latter case, and it has held its ground."
6
LordDenman in Green v. Cre'swell, (1839) 10 Ad. & Ell. 453.
'Williams' Saunders, note, 211-c.
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plaintiff brought this action of assumpsit against the defendant to
recover on his verbal promise to save the plaintiff harmless from
all payments he might incur by reason of th6 plaintiff signing the
bond of indemnity to Morris. The defendant made two contentions: (a) that plaintiff could not recover on the verbal promise
because of the fourth section of the statute of frauds, which provides that:
"No action shall be brought

.

.

whereby to charge the

.

defendant upon any special promise to answer for the debt, default,
or miscarriage of another person;

.

.

.

unless the agreement

upon which such action shall be brought, or some memorandum or
note thereof, shall be in writing, and signed by the party to be
charged therewith, or some person thereunto by him lawfully
authorized.""
(b) The defendaht contended that if he were liable at all, it
was only as a cosurety for contribution on the count for money
paid, which would limit his liability to £150. The trial court
directed a verdict for the plaintiff for £300, holding the defendant
liable on his verbal promise. The defendant obtained leave to
move to reduce the judgment to £150, which would be the extent
of his liability for contribution as a cosurety. But the rule nisi
obtained for this purpose was discharged, and the defendant was
held on his verbal promise, for the reason, stated Parke, J., that
this was "an original contract between these parties, that the plaintiff should be indemnified against the bond."
In Green v: Cresswell.9 Reay had brought a civil action against
Hadley, and Hadley failing to pay, a capias was issued,
directing the sheriff to arrest Hadley. Bail was indorsed thereon
in the sum of £35. The sheriff arrested Hadley as directed. To
secure his release, the defendant requested the plaintiff to become
bail and surety for Hadley on a bail bond, conditioned that Hadley
would put in special bail. The plaintiff signed Hadley's bail. The
effect was that the plaintiff bound himself either to satisfy the
creditor of the claim for the debt and costs, or surrender Hadley
into custody, provided judgment be against him in that action, and
the debtor failed to pay. To induce the plaintiff to sign Hadley's
bail bond, the defendant verbally promised that he would save the
plaintiff harmless, and indemnify him for all costs and damages
he might incur by such an act. The bail bond, which the plaintiff
'(1676) 29 Car. II, Sec. 4. American states have similar statutes.
most of them differing but little in wording from the English statute of
frauds.
'(1839) 10 Ad. & Ell. 453.
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signed, was made to the sheriff, as obligee, but he assigned it to
Reay, who sued the plaintiff, and recovered damages and costs. To
recover the loss sustained by the plaintiff as a result of his signature of the Hadley bail bond, plaintiff brought this action of
assumpsit on the defendant's verbal promise to save him harmless,
and which formed the inducement for the plaintiff's signing the
bond of Hadley. The trial court held this was a case outside the
statute of frauds and that the defendant was liable on his promise,
This judgment was arrested, and Lord Denman, contrary to the
trial court, held the defendant was not liable because this was a case
within the statute of frauds, and the promise should have been in
writing in order to make the defendant liable.
These two cases were decided by the same court
but eleven
years apart. The form of action in each case was assumpsit. In
spite of the general statement of the proposition of law in Thomas
v. Cook'0 by Bayley, J., that "a promise to indemnify does not, as it
appears to me, fall within either the words or the policy of the
statute of frauds," it is submitted the rule stated is not applicable
to that case. And regardless of Lord Denman's criticism of the
"reasoning'' of Thonmas v. Cook, some authorities contend that
Green v. Cresswell did not overrule that case. The facts in the
two cases are dissimilar, and it is believed the conclusion in each
case might be supported if the correct principles were applied."
Thonw4s v. Cook is correct in the conclusion reached, said the
"(1828) 8 Barn. & Cres. 728.
'The supreme court of New York, it must be admitted, eight years
prior to Green v. Cresswell, concluded to the contrary, after considering
very similar facts, on the ground that "this is clearly an original undertaking." But to decide that it is an original undertaking is no test, for
what constitutes an original undertaking is the question. The defendant
in the New York case requested the plaintiff to enter into an obligation
under seal to enable a third person to procure credit. Plaintiff was compelled to pay, sued the defendant to recover on his verbal promise, which
the court said was an original undertaking. Chapin v. Merrill, (1830)
4 Wend. (N. Y.) 657.
Such a view is clearly correct if the promisor had a pecuniary interest
to serve in making the promise to indemnify another. The primary purpose is the benefit to the promisor, and the statute of frauds does not
apply, even if incidentally it should be a promise to answer for the debt of
another. Boyer v. Soules, (1895) 105 Mich. 31, 62 N. W. 1000; Smith
v. Delaney, (1894) 64 Conn. 264, 29 Ati. 496.
Twenty-four years before Green v. Cresswell, the Massachusetts court
used language contrary to it, in a case involving identical facts, except
that the principal, who was imprisoned, gave property to th defendant to
indemnify him. He was sued on his verbal promise to indemnify the
plaintiff, who became bail, and was forced to pay. And while the court
said this was an original promise, it is submitted that the fact that the defendant was given property to indemnify him differentiates the case from
Green v. Cresswell. Perley v. Spring (1815) 12 Mass. 297.
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highest court of New Jersey, not for the reason on which the
opinion was placed, that it Nras a promise to indemnify, but because
the defendant promised the plaintiff that if the plaintiff would sign
-the bond with him, the defendant, then the defendant would save
him harmless.2 2 The defendant was verbally promising to save
the plaintiff harmless, if the plaintiff would become liable with the
defendafit and W. Cook on a bond to Morris. In other words,
plaintiff, defendant, and W. Cook were to become liable simultaneously to Morris. It was not a promise, therefore, "to answer
for the debt, default or miscarriage of another person," as provided
by. the statute of frauds, but a promise to answer for the
defendant's own default.
All statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly
construed. 3 The statute of frauds was in derogation of the common law. Therefore, it is not applicable to any case unless clearly
it comes within the provisions of the statute.
That a verbal promise by one to answer for his own debt, or
to indemnify another who becomes bound on an obligation with
'See Hartley v. Sanford, (1901) 66 N. J. L. 627, 50 At. 454, 55 L.R.
A. 206, in which it was said of Thomas v. Cook that "the promisor was
himself a signer of the bond against which he promised to indemnify the
promisee, and thus the promise was, in a reasonable sense, to answer for
that which, as to the promisee, was the promisor's own debt."
In the report of Green v. Cresswell in 4 Jurist 169, 170, Lord Denman
is recorded as having interpolated a similar observation during the argument of counsel, in answer to the contention that Thomas v. Cook there
applied: "It [Thomas v. Cook] was the case of a cosurety." Patterson, J.,
made the same distinction: "I do not see in that case whose default or
miscarriage the defendant had to answer for, except his own. The consideration for the promise moved from him; and all the parties, including
the plaintiff were to be guilty of a default before the indemnity arose.
There was no collateral security."
Browne, Statute of Frauds, 5th ed., sec. 161-a, says: "It is to be
noticed that in Thomas v. Cook the plaintiff and defendant became cosureties, while in Green v. Cresswell the defendant was not himself on the
bond; and this difference between the facts of the tvo cases has been supposed to distinguish them, upon the ground that where the defendant is
cosurety he is, as such without any special promise, liable already to contribute, and that his special promise to pay the whole may be regarded as
but a matter of regulation of contribution between the two sureties." See
also Rose v. Wollenburg, (1896) 31 Ore. 269, 44 Pac. 382,384, 39 L. R. A.
378, 65 A. S. R. 826.
1 Reed, Statute of Frauds, sec. 76, said of Thomas v. Cook: "... and
the fact that a third person is to be surety jointly with the promisor and
the plaintiff, and that the indemnity covers such person's obligation also,
does not make it a guaranty;- and it is important that this should be
stated, because that case is sometimes cited as going on still another
ground, viz., that a promise to indemnify one for becoming a surety is
not within the statute of frauds."
I 'Souter v. The Sea Witch, (1850) 1 Cal. 162, 163; Sibley v. Smith,
(1853) 2 Mich. 486, 490.
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the promisor, is not within the statute, is well settled. As the
Supreme Court of Ohio said many years ago:
S..if a surety on an obligation, upon his promise of
indemnity, procures another to go surety with him on the same
instrument, the promise is not within the statute, for the indemnity
promised is to secure his own default."' 14
It is believed that the facts of the Ohio case cited are identical
with Thomas v. Cook, and the general rule above quoted could
have been the ground for the decision in the English case.
In Green v. Cress-well, the verbal promise of the defendant
was to become effective contemporaneously with the commencement of the plaintiff's liability with Hadley-anotlwr person. To
secure a benefit for Hadley was the prime purpose of the defendant's promise. There was no pecuniary interest of the promisor to be subserved by his verbal promise. It was, therefore, a
promise to answer for the default of another person, and hot that
of the promisor, as it was in Thomas v. Cook.'5
"Ferrell v. Maxwell, (1876) 28 O1h. St. 383, 386-387; Horn v. Bray,
(1875) 51 Ind. 555, 19 Am. Rep. 744.
Unfortunately, this correct distinction was not followed in Bissig v:
Britton, (1875) 59 Mo. 204, 21 Am. Rep. 379, where it appears the defendant signed the replevin bond with the plaintiff, to whom defendant
made a verbal promise to indemnify. This was erroneously held to be
within the statute, and the view was approved subsequently in Hurt v.
,Ford, (1897) 142 Mo. 283, 44 S. W. 228, 41 L. R. A. 823.
The Virginia court of appeals fell into. the same error, partially by
following as a precedent Bissig v. Britton, (1875) 59 Mo. 204, 21 Am.
Rep. 379. Wolverton v. Davis, (1888) 85 Va. 64, 6 S. E., 619, 17 A. S.
R. 56.
'This is the reasoning of the Pennsylvania supreme court. In Nugent v. Wolfe, (1886) 111 Pa. 471, 4 AtI. 15, to induce plaintiff to become bail for a stay of execution on judgment against Powers and Co.,
defendant verbally promised to save him harmless. Plaintiff -was non.suited in an action brought on the verbal promise. The court said: "So
-far as appears, it was the proper debt of Powers & Co., and the substance
of defendant's agreement is that he would see that they paid it; and, if
they failed to do so, he would pay it for them. It was literally a promise
to answer for the default of Powers & Co. Plaintiff's liability as bail for
stay was merely collateral to the debt in judgment, and had in contemplation nothing but the payment thereof to the bank."
Frequent cases arise where to induce a qualified person to become
surety for another on a replevin or attachment bond, the defendant verbally agrees to see him harmless. If the defendant does not sign the bond
with the plaintiff, this promise is within the statute of frauds, and the defendant is not liable. Easter v. White (1861) 12 Oh. St. 219. See Hartley v. Sanford, (1901) 66 N. J. L. 627, 50 Atl. 454. If, however, the defendant also beconies liable with the plaintiff, the defendant is only promising to answer for his own debt, and not for that of another person. Ferrell v. Maxwell, (1876) 28 Oh. St. 383, 22 Am. Rep. 393. The obvious
reason for this distinction is that "the statute requires that a special
promise to answer for the debt, etc., of another shall be in writing; it
does not require that a promise to answer for a debt which is not the
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Subsequent opinions have stated that Reader v. Kinqhaml
overruled Green v. Cresswell. But nowhere in the former case is
it indicated that any of the Justices felt Green v. Crcsswell was
being overruled. The facts there were different from those present both in Thomas v. Cook and Green v. Cresswell. In Reader
v. Kinghaan, Malins had recovered judgment against Hitchcock
for £34, and had a warrant of commitment issued for the debtor.
The bailiff being about to arrest Hitchcock, the defendant Kingham, who was a relative, verbally promised the bailiff, who was the
plaintiff, that if he would not commit Hitchcock, he the defendant, would on the next Saturday either pay £ 17 to the plaintiff
or surrender Hitchcock. Defendant did neither. Malins previously had authorized the plaintiff to accept £17 in satisfaction
of the judgment; but nowhere is there any fact indicating that
Malins had authorized the plaintiff to accept that sum, or a security
for that sum in consideration of postponement of serving his warrant. The court held the defendant liable. The promise was not
within the statute of frauds. And the court's conclusion was correct for two reasons: (a) The promise was not made to the creditor, or one who would ever become the creditor of Hitchcock.
The bailiff would not be entitled to reimbursement for the £17
from Hitchcock, as was the promisee in Green v. Cress'well. The
promisee was a stranger. The court repudiated the argument that
the plaintiff was acting as agent for Malins. (b) The promise to
pay, or even the payment of the £17 did not, as the court emphasized, discharge Malins' demand against Hitchcock. It was not
intended that it should. The promise .of the defendant was that if
the plaintiff would not then execute the warrant to arrest Hitchcock, the defendant would pay the plaintiff, who was not and would
not become Hitchcock's creditor, the sum of £17. The forbearance to arrest Hitchcock was the cpnsideration. And if the defendant had paid the plaintiff the £17 as agreed, Malis could yet
recover £34 from Hitchcock, for the £17 was intended to be
in consideration of the forbearance to make the arrest, and not any
part in payment of the judgment. It had no connection, collaterally
or otherwise, with the debt owed by Hitchcock to Malins.
As Earle, C., said: "The debts were totally distinct debts, as well
debt of another but is partly the debt of the promisor, shall be in writing."
Beattie
v. Dinnick, (1896) 27 Ont. Rep. 285, 294.
1
(1862) 13 C. B. N. S. 343.
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as the debtors. '117 Nowhere in any of the opinions in that case is
any language used showing that any justice intended to overrule
Green v. Cresswell, which had been decided a quarter of a century
previously, though that case was discussed.
But in 1868, six years after Reader v. Kinghan, and twentynine years after Green v. Cresswell was decided, we find in Wildes
v. Dudlow'5 a conclusion reached, which applied to the facts, is
admittedly contrary to Green v. Cresswell. But it was decided
upon the assumption, believed to be incorrect, that "in the case of
Reader v. Kingham when the full number of Judges was present,
the case of Green v. Cresswell was overruled, and the law as laid
down by Thonms v. Cook restored." A reading of the three cases
should be convincing that, because of widely dissimilar facts, Green
v. Cresswell never overruled Thomas v. Cook, and there is nothing
in Reader v. Kingman which indicates an intention to overrule
Green v. Cresswell, and the principles of law announced in the last
two cases mentioned are entirely consistent.
In Wildes v. Dudlow, John Dudlow requested John N. Dudlow to sign a note with Wildeg to enable Wildes to procure credit.
John Dudlow verbally agreed with John N. Dudlow that if the
latter would, sign the note with Wildes, the former would indemnify John N. Dudlow from any loss. John N. Dudlow signed the
note with Wildes and was compelled to pay it. The court held that
John N. Dudlow could recover the £ 1,000 loss out of John Dudlow's estate, because the verbal promise was one of indemnity, and
not within the statute of frauds. It must be admitted that Wildes.
v. Dudlow is contrary, both in reasoning and conclusion, to Green
v. Cresswell; but it is believed to be erroneous in principle, even
though it is the law of England today. (a) It was not a promise
'Of Reader v. Kingham, (1862) 13 C. B. N. S. 343, it was said in
1 Reed, Statute of Frauds, sec. 100: "The plaintiff, Reader, a bailiff,
directed to arrest for contempt one H. A., a defaulting judgment debtor,
and authorized by M, the creditor, to take half the 'debt in satisfaction,
proceeded to arrest H. A., and Kingham, a relation of H. A., promised
Reader that he would either pay the debt or produce H. A. by a certain
time; this agreement was held to be exclusively between Reader and
Kingham; M: could not have sued upon it, and though H. A. would not
have been discharged by arrest under the process in question, and his debt
to M. survived; yet the promise not having been made to the creditor
M. it is not a guaranty, and Reader was not M's. agent to make such an
arrangement. To summarize this case, it may be said that H. A. owed
M., and Kingham owed Reader; that H. A. did not owe Reader, nor
Kingham owe M., therefore the promise of Kingham to answer to Reader
for H. A. was collateral to nothing."
"(1868) L. R. 19 Eq. 198.
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of indemnity, but a guaranty, because the defendant's promise was
collateral to Wildes' liability to John N. Dudlow. The latter could
have reimbursed himself from Wildes, and thus the promise, if
we follow the reasoning of the Mississippi court, hereinafter
quoted, was made to John N. Dudlow as creditor and not as debtor.
(b) The real basis for the opinion however,, was the feeling that
Reader v. Kingham overruled Green v. Cresswell. As previously
pointed out, Reader v. Kingham did not necessarily or indirectly
overrule it, and no language from the former opinion can be distorted to justify such a conclusion.
But English and American courts' and writers have repeated
the erroneous assumption from the opinion in Wildes v. Dudlow, to
the effect that Reader v. Kingham overruled Green v. Cresswell,
until it must be conceded, that both in England and a majority of
the American jurisdictions, the courts take the view that Green
v. Cresswell is not entitled to credit.
The only ground upon which the conclusion reached in Green
v. Cresswell is vulnerable to attack, is to say that the promise was
made to the debtor, and not to the creditor. It is well established
that promises for a valid consideration made to the debtor are
enforceable whether in writing or not, as such agreements are outside those contemplated by the statute of frauds.'9 To cite authorities that a surety who pays the obligation of a principal has the
right to recover the sum in an action at law against the principal,
seems useless. That is the rule in all cases where one is a surety
on a note or other obligation. 20 It is 'true of one who becomes
bound on a bail bond in a civil action. It was the rule for one
who became liable with the debtor for his appearance, at the time
when the law permitted the debtor to be arrested for failing to pay
his indebtedness. 21 But because of public policy, the surety on
"Eastwood v. Kenyon, (1840) 11 Ado!. & Ell. 438. Alger v. Scoville,

(1854) 1 Gray (Mass.) 391. This argument was employed in Aldrich v.
Ames, (1857) 9 Gray (Mass.) 76, where.the plaintiff, at the request of
the defendant, became bail for a third person, on which the defendant
promised the plaintiff to indemnify him. The court said: "This is a
promise by the defendant to another, to pay his debt, or, in other words,
to save him from the performance of an obligation which might result in
a debt. But it is a promise to the debtor to pay his debt, and thereby to
relieve him from the payment of it himself, which is not within the statute of frauds."
"Chapin v. Lapham, (1839) 20 Pick. (Mass.) 467.
'This was recognized by Lord Denman in Green v. Cresswell, (1839) 10
Ad. & Ell. 453 when he said: ".

.

. and, besides, may it not be said that

the arrested debtor, who obtains his freedom by being bailed, undertakes
to his bail to keep them harmless, by paying the debt, .or surrendering?"
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a criminal bail bond cannot recover against the person for whom
he becomes responsible. And it is contended herein lies one great
difference between the verbal promise to one who, as in Green
v. Cresswell, becomes a surety on a civil bail bond, and such a verbal promise to one who is likewise liable on a criminal bail bond as
in Crippsv. Harnoll.22 It is true, plaintiff was the debtor of Reay
-(1863) 4 B. & S. 415. This difference is there succinctly pointed out
in this language: "Here the bail was given in a criminal proceeding;
and, where bail is given in such a proceeding, there is no contract on the
part of the person bailed to indemnify the person who became bail for
him. There is no debt, and with respect to the person- who bails, there is
hardly a duty; and it may very well be that the promise to indemnify the
bail in a criminal matter should be considered purely as an indemnity,
which it has been decided to be .... This view of the subject creates,
I think, a broad distinction between the present case and Green v. Cresswell . . , which we are not called upon either to overrule or to say that
we entirely support." Accord, Holmes v. Knights, (1839) 10 N. H. 175.
Of this distinction between civil and criminal bail in Cripps v. Hartnoll, (.1863) 4 B. & S. 415 it was said, erroneously, it is submitted, in
Anderson v. Spence, (1880) 72 Ind. 315, 318, that: "We confess, however, that it seems to us that there was a real conflict between the doctrine
of Green v. Cresswell and that of Cripps v. Hartnoll, and that the distinction attempted to be made by the latter case was simply an effort to
get rid of an unsound doctrine without expressly overruling it." The
same error crept into the view expressed in the obiter in May v. Williams.
(1883) 61 Miss. 125, 132, that: "We do not assent to the proposition that
a principal in a bail bond is not under an implied contract to indemnify
his surety."
o Jones v. Orchard, (1855) 16 C. B.617, said: "The rule was moved
on the ground that a contract, ina criminal case, to indemnify the bail
against the consequences of a default of the principal's appearance on the
trial of the indictment, is contrary to public policy, and therefore that
the law will not presume any such contract. It is unnecessary to decide
that point on the present occasion, although we are inclined to think the
objection well founded, and that such a contract would be contrary to
public policy, inasmuch as it would be in effect giving the security of one
person only, instead of two." The conclusion is reached, however, that
"an express contract to indemnify against costs would not be illegal; and
consequently there can be no reason why the law should not imply an
indemnity under the circumstances."
Stearns, Suretyship, 3rd ed. sec. 279, says the surety on a bail bond
has no right of indemnity against the principal, "except upon an express
contract for indemnity." It is difficult to see why, if it is against public
policy to imply such a contract, one may be made expressly which obviously would be against the same public policy.
In Herman v. Jeuchner, (1885) L. R. 15 Q. B. D. 561, this was stated:
"When a man is ordered to find bail, and a surety becomes responsible
for him, the surety is bound at his peril to see that his principal obeys
the order of the court; at least, this is the rule in the criminal law; but
if money to the amount for which surety is bound is deposited with him
as an indemnity against any loss which he may sustain by reason of hig
principal's conduct, the surety has no interest in taking care that the
condition of the recognizance is performed. Therefore the contract between the plaintiff and the defendant is tainted with illegality."
Speaking for the Supreme Court of the United States, Mr. Justice
Bradley, in United States v. Ryder, (1883) 110 U. S.729, 736, 28 L. Ed.
308, 4 S. C. R. 196 said of Cripps v. Hartnoll, (1863) 4 B. & S. 415, that
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in Green v. Cresswell; but it was contemplated that as between
plaintiff and defendant, in case the plaintiff was compelled to pay
Reay, the plaintiff would be creditor of Hadley, who would be
liable to the plaintiff for reimbursement. With this reasoning, the
defendant made the promise to the creditor, and not to the debtor.
In accord with this view is the reasoning of the Mississippi supreme court, which, if it were followed, would reconcile Green v.
Cresswell, and harmonize other apparent contradictions:
"It cannot be said that the promise to indemnify the surety
is made to him as debtor and not as creditor. It is true that both
the principal and surety are bound to the fourth person, the state;
but the contract of the promisor is not to discharge that obligation.
He assumes no duty or debt to the state, nor does he agree with
the promisee to pay the state the debt which may become due to
it if default shall be made by the principal in the bond. It is only
when the promisee has changed his relationship of debtor to the
state and assumed that of creditor to his principal by paying to
the state the penalty for which he and his principal were bound
that a right arises to go against the guarantor on his contract. It is
to one who is under a conditional and contingent liability that the
promise is made; but it is to him as creditor, and not as debtor,
that a right of action arises on it."2
In the view of the Mississippi court, bad it been followed in
the other cases, the promise would of course be made to the promisee as creditor and not as the debtor. It would aid in harmonizing
it had not been shaken "by any subsequent case in England or in this
country," and added: "The object of bail in civil cases is, either directly
or indirectly, to secure the payment of a debt or other civil duty; whilst
the object of bail in criminal cases is to secure the appearance of the
principal before the court for the purposes of public justice. Payment
by the bail in a civil case discharges the obligation of the principal to his
creditor, and is only required to the extent of that obligation, whatever
may be the penalty of the bond or recognizance; whilst payment of the
bail of their recognizance in criminal cases, though it discharges the bail,
does not discharge the obligation of the principal to appear in court; that
obligation still remains and- the principal may at any time be retaken .and
brought into court."
='May v. Williams, (1883) 61 Miss. 125, 48 Am. Rep. 80. Italics by the
author.
This reasoning, though not followed, was recognized in this language
in Demeritt v. Bickford, (1879)

58 N. H. 523: " . . . the law raises an

implied promise of indemnity by the principal from the existence of the
relation of principal and surety, to which the express promise of the
promisor is collateral, and, therefore, within the statute."
The view of the Mississippi court, if noticed at all, was not followed
by the High Court of Justice for Ontario, which said in Beattie v. Dinnick, (1896) 27 Ont. Rep. 285, 293: "But where the promise is made to
one who is not a creditor, that if he will incur a liability to some third
person, the promisor will indemnify him against it, it is not made to him
as creditor at all, but rather in the character which he is asked to assume
of debtor to the third person."
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the principles underlying the cases. But search of the authorities
convinces that the Mississippi court, even if logical, stands alone.
A number of jurisdictions hold with the principle applied in Green
v. Cresswell, but it is obvious if they recognize the promisee as
debtor to the third person, and not as creditor to another, their
reasoning is not logical. The view seems established that the statute of frauds contemplated only such obligations of the third
party as previously existed or were.assumed by the promisee contemporaneously at the time the _promisor became bound. Evidently, the -courts do not favor the application of the statute to
such obligations as come into existence only impliedly and as legal
incidents of the contract entered into by the promisee and his
obligee.

24

In Thonms v. Cook, it was needlessly stated that "a promise
to indemnify does not fall within either the words or the polic.y of
the statute of frauds." On the authority of this language, the
generalization has been made that contracts of indemnity are not
within the statute, and, therefore, need not be in writing3 But
- In Tighe v. Morrison, (1889) 116 N. Y. 263, 22 N. E. 164, 5 L. R. A.
617, it was said: "Were there two concurrent liabilities in the case under consideration? There was the liability of the defendant, the 'special'
promisor, to the plaintiff, the promisee, but there was no liability on the
part of Dowdall, the third person, to the promisee at the time the promise
was made or when the bond was executed. Dowdall, as already suggested, was under no legal obligation to the plaintiff until by his default he
had compelled him to pay the bond, and then his liability arose not out
of any promise on his part, but sprang by operation of law from the fact
of payment only."
3 Col. L. Rev. 104, 105, says: "It is asserted that in these cases of
indemnity the debt which the defendant engages to discharge is that implied obligation of the third party to the promisee which arises on
the making of the parol promise, but it may well be doubted whether
the statute was intended to include in its operation an obligation of a
third person which exists or is to exist solely by virtue of and as incidental to the special contract which the plaintiff seeks to enforce." Accord, Browne, Statute of Frauds 5th ed., sec. 162.
See also Allen v. Pryor, (1821) 3 A. K. Marsh (Ky.) 305; Pike
v. Brown, (1851) 7 Cush. (Mass.) 133,136; Goodwin et al v. Gilbert et
al., (1813) 9 Mass. 510, 514.
'Steams, 3rd ed., sec. 32: "If the promise is merely to indemnify
another upon a liability which he incurs to a third, there is very little,
if any, conflict of authority but that it is not within the statute and so
need not be in writing."
See Dunn v. West, (1845) 5 B. Monroe (Ky.) 376; George v. Hoskins, (1895) 17 Ky. L. Rep. 63, 30 S. W. 406; Vogel v. Means, (1872)
31 Wis. 306.
1 Reed on Statute of Frauds, sec. 144, says: "In the leading and
much disputed case of Thomas v. Cook the ruling that an indemnity for
a guaranty is not within the Statute of Frauds, while explicitly laid
down, is in reality only dictum. . . So that, admitting that later decisions, which undertook to reverse Thomas v. Cook, were wrong, and the
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what constitutes a contract of indemnity? The word indemnity
conveys at least four meanings: "First, in the sense of giving
security; and second, in the sense of relieving a party from liability or damages already accrued ;1'26 third, the right of one on
paying the principal's obligation for which he became liable, to
recover in an action of assumpsit against the principal ;27 fourth,
the case of the indemnitor promising to save harmless the indemnitee against liability to a third person. 28 To illustrate the first:
A promises B to save him harmless if he will sign C's note as
a surety. The second meaning will be illustrated by a promise by
A to B to pay him for a loss already suffered. If A were surety
on a note payable to C of which B were principal, and A paid the
note at maturity, he would have the right to recover from B the
sum he paid C. This would illustrate the third meaning. In the
fourth case, if A, a judgment creditor promises the sheriff, who
refuses to seize the personalty of B, the debtor, without indemnity, that he, A, will save the sheriff and his sureties harmless from
any loss resulting from such seizure, he will be bound, even though
the promise is verbal. 29 Obviously, the obiter in Thonas v. Cook
should be confined to cases which would fall within the fourth
class. In that class the promise is not collateral to the liability of
another person. It is original. To call a contract one of indemnity, will not make it one. Because in an agreement the word
"indemnity" occurs, it cannot be said that it is unaffected by the
statute of frauds any more than it can be asserted that an agreement to pay the debt of another must always be in writing because
it is not a contract of indemnity. As Pollock said:
"Now it has been laid down, that a mere promise of indemnity is not within the statute of frauds, and there are many cases
which would exemplify the correctness of that decision. On the
other hand an undertaking to answer for the debt or default of
another is within the statute of frauds, and no doubt some cases
might be put where it is both the one and the other, that is to say
where the promise to answer for the debt or default of another
latter case is now good law, it by no means follows that the statement
therein sustaining an oral indemnity for a guaranty is anything but an
erroneous dictum, given as a reason for a sound decision. The weight of
the American decisions is perhaps in favor of applying the Statute of
Frauds to these indemnities."
'Lawson v. Halifax-Tonopah Mining Co., (1913) 36 Nev. 591, 135
Pac. 611, 613; Weller v. Eames, (1870) 15 Minn. 461, 467, 2 Am. Rep. 150.
'Brandt, Suretyship and Guaranty 3rd ed. Chapter IX.
'Brandt, Suretyship and Guaranty 3rd ed. sec. 52c.
'Mays v. Joseph, (1877) 34 Oh. St. 22.
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would involve what might, very properly and legally, be called an
indemnity. Where that is the case, in all probability- the undertaking would be considered as within the statute of frauds if it
were to answer for the debt or default of another, notwithstanding
it might also be an indemnity." 30
Certainly the cases justify us in saying that one contract called
an indemnity may in reality be a guaranty and another designated
as guaranty may in truth be an indemnity contract. 31 Truly, we
'32
may conclude that "indemnity contracts are of great variety.
Where the statute of frauds is concerned, the question is usually
whether the contract is one of indemnity or a guaranty, and suretyship agreements, as technically understood, are not concerned.
Some of the recognized differences between indemnity and guaranty may well be enumerated, even though they overlap each
other:
(a) In an indemnity contract, no debt is owed to the promisee
by the third person. A contract of indemnity is an original and
independent one. A guaranty, however, presupposes a debt owing
33
to the promisee by a third person.
(b) The indemnitor engages to save another from loss upon
'Cripps v. Hartnoll, (1863) 4 B. & S. 415. Garner v. Hudgins,
(1870) 46 Mo. 399, 401, recognized this distinction: "It has been sometimes held that a promise to indemnify did not come within the statute,
but it seems to be now well settled by the better authorities that where
the promise is collateral merely, the promisor having no interest in the
liability guaranteed against, and being under no obligations to pay it, it is
not obligatory unless in writing." Gansey v. Orr, (1903) 173 Mo. 532, 73
S. W. 477.
"When the promise to indemnify is in fact a promise to pay the debt
of another, then, clearly, such promise is within the statute; and the fact
that it is in form a promise to indemnify will make no difference." Cheesman v. Wiggins, (1890) 122 Ind. 352, 23 N. E. 945.
'IDe Colyar's observation emphasizes the statement above made: "...
while on the one hand, a contract, which is in substance a guarantee,
will not cease to be one from being put into the form of an indemnity,
so, on the other hand, one which is in substance an indemnity, and imports
no primary liability, will not lose that character from being shaped as or
termed a guarantee." De Colyar, Principal and Surety 3rd ed., p. 58. See
Rowlatt, Principal and Surety 41; Mallett v. Bateman, (1864) 16 C. B.
N.. S..530.
Wolthausen v. Trimpert, (1919) 93 Conn. 260, 105 Atl. 687, 688.
.'Hall v. Equitable Surety Co., (1917) 126 Ark. 535, 191 S. W. 32, 34.
These rules require compliance, according to the generalization from
the cases, found in 23 Harv. L. Rev. 136, 137, in order to constitute a
guaranty: (1) The promise must be collateral to some liability on the
part of a principal. (2) The principal's default is a condition precedent
to the promisor's liability: Therefore, the statute of frauds is inapplicable
to a promise contemplating absolute liability. (3) The obligations of the
principal and guarantor must be coextensive and of a similar nature.
(4) The promisor must have a right to be reimbursed by the principal;
otherwise, there is no guaranty.
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some obligation he has incurred or is about to incur on account of a
third person, while a guarantor's promise is to one to whom another
is answerable. 34
(c) The contract of indemnity is an original one to save the
indemnitee harmless against future loss or damage. The contract
of guaranty is a collateral one, and presupposes some contract or
transaction to which it is secondary. 5
(d) The indemnitor agrees to become liable whenever the
promisee suffers loss; the guarantor's promise is to become liable
conditionally when the principal debtor defaults.3 6
(e) -Ifthe liability of the third person is existing, and noi
merely in contemplation at the time the defendant makes his
promise, it cannot be *an indemnity contract. It must be one of
guaranty if the obligation of the .third person, for whom the
37
promisee becomes responsible, is preexisting.
(f) An indemnitee has no remedy on the contract against a
third person. His remedy is by direct action against the indemnitor. In the case of a guaranty, the third person for whom the
promisee became. responsible, may be sued by the promisee for
reimbursement,. if he is damaged.38
"4Texas Fidelity & Bonding Co. v. General Bonding and Casualty Co.,
Tex. Civ. App., (1916) 184 S. W. 238, 240-241; Hall v. Equitable Surety
Co., (1917) 126 Ark. 535, 191 S. W. 32, 34; U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co.
v. Bank of Hattiesburg, (1922) 128 Miss. 605, 91 So. 344, 346; Eastern
Surety Co. v. Kelley, (1911) 27 S.Dak. 465, 131 N. W. 808.
'Wolthausen v. Trimpert, (1913) 93 Conn. 260, 105 At. 687, 688;
Brandt, Suretyship and Guaranty 3rd ed.; sec. 5.
'See opinions by Lopes, L. J., and Davey, L. J., in Guild v. Conrad,
[1894] 2 Q. B. 885, 895, and 896, respectively. The opinion of Lopes, L. J.
is discussed in Beattie v. Dinnick, (1896) 27 Ont. Rep. 285, 292.
7"The distinction between a promise to pay a debt already due a
creditor, or one to be created upon the faith of the promise on the one
hand; and a promise that if the promisee will incur a liability, the promisor
will indemnify him against it on the other hand, is not at all a shadowy
one, and when the terms of the statute and the interpretation placed upon
it by undisputed cases are considered, the reasons for holding the latter
class of promises to be unaffected by it, while holding the former class
to be within it, seem to be unanswerable." Beattie v. Dinnick, (1896) 27
Ont. Rep. 285, 293, Falconbridge on Guarantees and the Statute of Frauds,
40 Can. Law Times 388. 397, 68 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 137, 155, says: "On the
other hand, if the liability of the third party is existing, not merely in
contemplation, at the time of the defendant's promise, it would appear to
be impossible to regard the transaction as a contract of indemnity."
'For this reason, a verbal promise to save the promisee harmless if
he will go on the criminal bail bond of a third person, is outside the
statute. There is no implied right of reimbursement. "The contract is
an original and independent one, in which there is no debt or default
toward the promisee, to which there are no collateral contracts, and in
which there is no remedy against the third party. . . The general rule
running through almost all the cases is, that, if the third person is not
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(g) Under an indemnity contract, no right of action accrues
against the indemnitor until the indemnitee suffers the loss against
which the contract protects him. The indemnitee has no rights
against the indemnitor merely because he may possibly suffer loss,
but it is the actual loss which entitles him to recovery. A guaranty, however, if it be a guaranty of payment, fixes the liability of
the guarantor at the time when the principal debtor fails to pay
at maturity. 39
It is believed that these distinctions between indemnity and
guaranty justify the conclusions in Green v. Cresswell, and had
the courts been discriminating in the sense in which the term
"indemnity" was used, the century of conflict, confusion and groping would have been spared. By failing to apply the proper reasoning, and by blindly following an erroneous statement of an
English opinion, both Scylla and Charybdis have been encountered.
Verbal promisors will continue-to be uncertain of their liabilities
until the courts make some earnest effort at clarification of terminology. The suggestions here made point out some outstanding
characteristics.
Certainly in Green v. Cresswell, the special promise of the
defendant created "a new liability collateral to some liability already
liable, then the undertaking 'is not within the statute. This doctrine is
exemplified in the great number of cases, which hold that a promise to
answer for the debt or default of an infant or feme covert is not within
the statute, because there is no third person bound." Anderson v. Spence,
(1880) 72 Ind. 315, 321. If this be correct, then reimbursement could not
be recovered in a case like Watkins- v. Perkins, (1697) 1 Lord Raymond
224, for the same reason.
In Administrators of Beaman v. Russell, (1848) 20 Vt. 205, 49 Am.
Dec. 775, it'was said: ",.. . it seems agreed in all the cases, that, if the
promise is not collateral to the liability of some other person to the same
party, it is not within the statute. . . In this case, unless there was
some person liable to indemnify the plaintiff for signing the notes to the
Bank of Rutland, other than the defendant, his undertaking was an original and not a -collateral one." (Author's italics.)
The general rule is stated in "28 Corpus Juris 892 to be that "a contract of indemnity is original and independent, to which there is no collateral contract and with respect to which there is no remedy against the
third party." Corroborative of this general statement, this language was
used: "The promise in an indemnity contract is an original, and not a
collateral, undertaking. . . The remedy of the indemnitee who has paid
or incurred expense is by direct action against the indemnitor." Bain
v. Arthur, (1911) 129 La. 143, 55 So. 743.
'Adler v. Sawyer, (1919) 39 Cal. App. 778, 181 Pac. 817, 818.
From the above statement, it logically results that if it be a guaranty
of payment, the statute of limitations begins to run against the promisee's
right to bring the action against the guarantor as soon as there is a default
in performance whether the promisee has suffered damage or not. If
the promise be an indemnity, the statute will not begin to run until the
promisee sustains pecuniary loss or is damaged. See note 126 A. S. R. 946.
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existing or intended to be raised."40 The defendant in that case
became the promisor to the plaintiff, whose action was brought as
creditor, but who was not permitted to recover because (a) the
defendant's promise was verbal, and (b) it was a promise primarily for the benefit of another, for whom the promisee became
responsible, and against whom, on his default, the plaintiff had a
right of action for reimbursement.
While generally it is true, as stated in the obiter in Bayley's
opinion in Thomas v. Cook, that contracts of indemnity are not
within the statute of frauds, all which the courts have called indemnity contracts are not the same. If the indemnitee assumes the
debt of another, it is then within the statute, as Green v.Cress'well
decided,"' but not if the indemnitee has no right of reimbursement
against the third person w;hose obligation he has assumed. But if
the contract be made, even orally, to guaranty the fidelity of a person, it is not required to be in writing.4 2 Likewise, the promisor is
liable if the promisee agrees to pay the debt of a third person, who,
43
because of incapacity to contract, is not legally liable.
The cases referred to make it obvious that by whatever name
the agreement is designated, the liability of the verbal promisor
must depend upon (a) whether the original party remains liable;
(b) whether there is any liability on the promisor except that cre'2 Street, Foundations of Legal Liability, 187.
'Sweet v. Colleton, (1893) 96 Mich. 391, 55 N. W. 984, says: "The
test to be applied is whether the party sought to be charged is the principal debtor, primarily liable, or whether he is only liable in case of the

default of a third person; whether the party promising contracted an independent obligation of his own, or whether his position to the creditor was

that of a surety merely."
2 -Page, Contracts, 2nd ed., sec. 1249: "If A, in order to induce B to
become surety for C, promises to indemnify him against any loss, arising
out of such suretyship, the question of the application of the Statute of
Frauds depends on the view of such transaction taken by the courts.
A's promise may be regarded as a promise of B to pay B's debt to the
obligee. If this view of the essential of the transaction is entertained,
A's promise is not within the Statute of Frauds. Other authorities look
on A's promise as a promise to pay C's debt to B if C does not, and
hence
within the statute."
4
'Quinn-Shepherdson Co. v. U. S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co., (1919)

142 Minn. 428, 172 N. W. 693. See Tighe v. Morrison, (1889) 116 N. Y.
263, 22 N. E. 164, 5 L. R. A. 617.
See a contrary view expressed in Commonwealth v. Hinson, (1911)
143 Ky. 428, 136 S.W. 912, Ann. Cas. 1912D 291, L. R. A. 1917B 139.
So a lawyer, who was so certain of his ability he made a verbal promise to the printer that if the latter would print the former's client's brief
on appeal, the promisor would pay the printer's bill if the client lost the
case, was compelled to keep his promise. The statute of frauds did not
protect him. Wilkie v. Marshall, (1909) 77 N. J. L. 272, 72 Atl. 30.
1 Brandt, Suretyship and Guaranty 3rd ed., sec. 69, and cases there
cited.
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ated by the, promise upon which reliance is had; and (e) whether
there is any liability of the third party to indemnify the promisee. 4
If there is no duty, express or implied, on the third person to reimburse the promisee, the courts of England and America seem to
agree that the promise is not one' intended to be in writing by the
statute of frauds. The disagreement is seen in those cases where
there is an agreement, express or implied, on the part of the third
person to reimburse the promisee.
One would be pertinacious, indeed, who would contend that
the opinions during the last century, filling volumes on this subject,
are reconcilable with each other. Obvious misapplication of principles has been made to facts, and courts have indulged in the
great common law amusement of adhering to the rule of stare
decisis by discriminating, rather than by frankly overruling a prior
absurdity. But it believed that all the cases are able to be grouped
into one of these four classes:
(A) Cases .where the promisor becomes bound with the
promisee to pay the same obligation to a third person. The statute
requires only those agreements to pay the debt or default "of
another person" to be in writing. Those verbal contracts to pay
the debt or default of the promisor, in whole or in part, are not
affected by the statute, and are enforceable as they were at the
common law. In this class should be placed Thomas v. Cook. The
previous afialysis of that case shows the defendant verbally promised to pay his own debt or default. In spite of the brief opinion
referring to indemnity contracts, it is submitted this was not an
indemnity contract to which that language should be applicable, and
45
the ground for the opinion is inapplicable to the facts.
(B) Cases where the verbal promisor agrees to indemnify the
promisee for any loss caused by a third person, there being no collateral obligation, express or implied, from the third person to
reimburse the promisee. The promisor here is held liable. In this
class Reader v; Kingharn deserves to be placed.
(C) Cases where the promisor is not bound with the promisee,
and the promisee becomes bound to pay the pre-existing or concurrently assumed obligation of .a third person, the promisor's object
being to protect the third person or secure for him credit.
"Beattie v. Dinnick, (1896) 27 Ont. Rep. 285, 294; Browne, Statute of
Frauds 5th ed. secs. 159; 161.
'In this class also should be placed Ferrell v. Maxwell, (1876) 28 Oh.
St. 383 and Horn v. Bray, (1875) 51 Ind. 555, 19 Am. Rep. 744. And
while the conclusion reached is erroneous, in this class also should be
'placed Bissig v. Britton, (1875) 59 Mo. 204, 21 Am. Rep. 379, and Wolverton v. Davis. (1888) 85 Va. 64. 6 S. E. 619, 17 A. S. R. 56.
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This class requires an obligor, an obligee, and a principal
debtor. Such promise the statute requires to be in writing.
Clearly, Green v.Cresswell should b'e classified here. The plaintiff there was the obligee to whom the defendant made the promise
that Hadley would not default. Concurrently with the plaintiff's
liability thereon, Hadley became liable to the plaintiff for reimbursement. "The original party remained liable; and the defendant
incurred no liability except from his promise."46 Therefore, the
defendant verbally promised the plaintiff, who by Hadley's default
became Hadley's creditor for the amount of the default, that he
would be responsible for that loss. The defendant's object was to
serve no personal or pecuniary interest. His object was to answer
for the debt or default "of another person." It was correctly
decided, and should not be cited as overruling Thomas v. Cook.
And if some court recognizing the correct principle should overrule Wildes v. Dudlow it would deserve a place in this class also.
(D) Cases where the promisor does not become bound with
the promisee, but the promisor becomes liable to pay the obligation of a third person, his main purpose in mdking the promise
being to secure something of value for himself. To discuss the
cases in this class would be outside the purview of this article.
Consideration of the cases convinces that by the employment
of vague language and by lack of clarity of expression, the courts
have left the law inhopeless confusion. The cases are not decided
on principle in many instances, but by blindly following illogical
precedents, the courts have arbitrarily decided each case. The law
in many cases has been applied to facts to which it is unsuited.
The view in England without question is that Thonmas v. Cook was
overrruled by Green v. Cresswell, which in turn was overrruled,
and Thomas v. Cook reinstated. This is the majority view in the
47
United States, though many states adhere to Green v. Cresswell.
Thon=a v. Cook reached the correct conclusion, but the' reasoning
is not applicable to the facts, therefore improperly reasoned. Green
v. Cresswelt reached the correct conclusion by logical reasoning.
Reader v. Kingham is correct both in its conclusion and ratio
decidendi. Wildes v. Dudlow rests upon a false premise; therefore, it is both fallacious in its reasoning and erroneous in the result
reached.
'The concluding sentence of Lord Denman's opinion in Green v.
Cresswell, (1839) 10 Ad. & Ell. 453.
'2 Col. L. Rev. 104.

